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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Attorneys-Unauthorized Practice of Law by Corporations
In State v. Pledger- the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that an employee of a shell homes corporation, who had prepared
either directly or indirectly deeds of trust by filling in the blanks of
printed forms in the course of the corporate business, was not guilty
of the unauthorized practice of law.2 The decision rested on the
ground that the defendant did not prepare legal documents "for
another person, firm or corporation" within the intent and meaning
of G.S. § 84-4. The court interpreted this statute to mean that
"a person, firm or corporation having a primary interest, not mnerely
an incidental interest, in a transaction, may prepare legal documents
necessary to the furtherance and completion of the transaction without violating G.S. § 84-4."'
The court was quite correct in reversing conviction for violation
of G.S. § 84-4 prohibiting the practice of law by individuals for
another. The indictment in this case was against the individual
defendant who was an agent of the corporation acting in the course
257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962).
2 Generally, the practice of law is not confined to performing services in
court, but includes conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, advice given to clients, and all actions taken for another in legal
matters. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-2.1 (1958) ; In re Duncan, 83 S.C.
186, 187, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909) ; 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 3(g) (1937).
8257 N.C. at 637, 127 S.E.2d at 339 (1962). (Emphasis added.) In
preparing deeds of trust for. a finance company, defendant was held guilty
of violating G.S. § 84-4 because "as to the defendant, this corporation was
'another ...corporation' within the meaning of the statute.. .

."

Id. at 638,

127 S.E.2d at 340.
The defense used by some corporations who rely on the "incidentto-business" theory is the claim that no separate charge is made for the
services. E.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n,
135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); Cooperman v. West Coast Title
Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954). However, other cases hold this defense
to be invalid because there is still an indirect compensation to the corporation in the way of business. E.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J.
Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960). In still others
the court found that there was an unauthorized practice of law because the
total services for which the customer paid was so high as to include a fee
'for the legal services rendered. E.g., Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar
Ass'n, 230 Ark. 494, 326 S.W.2d 900 (1959); In re Gore, 58 Ohio App.
79, 15 N.E.2d 968 (1937) ; Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm.,
142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944); Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190
S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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of his employment; but since a corporation can act only through its
agents, the corporation was, in effect, the defendant. However,
G.S. § 84-5 prohibits the practice of law by corporations.4 The court
made no reference to this statute and expressed no opinion as to
whether the defendant's acts were in violation of its command. It is
clear, therefore, that Pledger does not preclude an indictment and
conviction in North Carolina of persons who prepare deeds of trust
in the course of their employment by a real estate corporation, unless
the court's construction of G.S. § 84-4 be taken as a gloss on G.S.
§ 84-5 as well. Under G.S. § 84-4 as now interpreted a corporation
may perform legal services so long as they are incidental to its
usual course of business. If the two statutes are now construed
in pari materia it may well be that the court has, perhaps inadvertently, laid the groundwork for a holding that G.S. § 84-5
also permits a limited practice of law by corporations "incident to
business." This approach may be necessary to resolve the dilemma
propounded when one statute confers a privilege which another
purports to take away. 5
The purpose of all suits to enjoin corporations from preparing
legal documents allegedly constituting an unlawful practice of law is
to protect the licenses, privileges and franchises granted to
attorneys from encroachment and damage by reason of the
alleged unauthorized acts of the defendant ... [and] to protect the public and particularly those persons participating in
'"[N]o corporation shall . . . draw agreements, or other legal documents
•.,or practice law, or give legal advice ... by or through any person .... "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (1958). The only corporations excepted from
this statute are banks, and then only in specified circumstances. One cannot
help but wonder why the indictment was drawn under G.S. § 84-4. It is
a well known rule of criminal procedure that the indictment must state
a crime. Even though the defendant may in fact be guilty under the facts
of some crime, unless that crime is charged specifically in the indictment he
must be found innocent. State v. Law, 227 N.C. 103, 40 S.E.2d 699 (1946) ;
42 C.J.S. Indictmzents & Informations§§ 137, 261 (1944). If the complexities
of indicting corporations are insurmountable in a particular case it should
be possible to obtain an injunction against further violations of the law.
See Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 3, where
injunction was used instead of indictment.
'The answering argument is that G.S. § 84-4 does not conifer a right on
corporations to practice law incident to their business, but merely does not
prohibit it. Construed in this way G.S. § 84-4 as interpreted in the principal
case and G.S. § 84-5 are corollary; that which is omitted from G.S. § 84-4 is
prohibited by G.S. § 84-5. This would seem to be the best argument, but
the language of the case gives the impression that the court would be inclined
to the other line of reasoning.
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real estate transactions through brokers, from the dangers
inherent in the preparation of legal documents by persons un-skilled in the intricacies of the law rather than by lawyers.'
Nearly all states, either by statute7 or judicial decision,' forbid a
corporation to practice law under any circumstances. Due to the
nature of corporations it necessarily follows that "acts of officers of
a corporation who are regular, salaried employees, performed in the
course of their employment, are acts of the corporation as affecting
the determination as to whether the corporation is engaged in the
practice of law." 9 In spite of the flat prohibition of their statutes,
several states allow certain corporations to transact their own legal
business and to perform certain acts necessarily incident to the proper
performance of their authorized business function, even though these
very acts would constitute the unauthorized practice of law were they
not so permitted."0 These jurisdictions have avoided statutes similar
to G.S. § 84-5 on two grounds: (1) such acts do not constitute the
practice of law,'1 (2) public policy favors such activities by corpora' Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 413,
312 P.2d 998, 1006 (1957).
7E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, §46 (1955); N.C. GE-. STAT. §84-5
(1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:170-78 (1953); N.Y. PENAL LAWS §280
(1944); OHiO REV. CODE §§ 1701.03, 4705.01 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,

§ 1608 (1930); S.C. CODE §§ 56-141, -142 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-303
(1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 3 (1959) (see note 16,
infra).
'E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366
P.2d 1 (1961); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn.
222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958) ; Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d
914 (1942). In State ex rel. Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc., 209
N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 504 (1936), the court held that the right to practice law
is personal and, therefore, a corporation cannot do it either directly or
indirectly by employing lawyers to practice for it.
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 956, at 404 (1940).
"0See generally cases and statutes cited notes 11 & 12, infra; Annot., 157
A.L.R. 285 (1945) ; 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 956, at 406 (1940).
" Bar Ass'n v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326
S.W.2d 767 (1959) held that even though activities of the title guaranty
company constitute practice of law within the meaning of TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-303 (1955) forbidding a corporation to practice law, they will not be
declared unlawful if incidental to the main business of the corporation.
Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 428, 312 P.2d 1011, 1014
(1957), decided on CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1-17 (1953), held that "a
layman or a corporation may prepare instruments to which he or it is a party
without being guilty of the unauthorized practice of law." In the Colorado
case the corporation as mortgagee was allowed to prepare mortgages, but not
to fill in blanks affecting conveyancing 'of property. State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 248; 264, 131 A.2d 646, 655
(Sup. Ct. 1957), relying on CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-88 (1960),' held
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The New York Penal Law § 280 provides that no corporation
shall itself or by or through its officers, agents, or employees render
legal services. A corporation, under this statute, is not to receive
compensation directly or indirectly for preparing legal instruments.
It excepts corporations lawfully engaged in examining and insuring
titles to real property from its provisions in so far as preparation
of legal instruments is necessary to the examination and insuring
of titles and necessary or incidental to loans made by the corporation.
Up to this point the New York statute appears very liberal. However, it further provides that no corporation may render any legal
services which may not be rendered by a layman. The purpose of
the statute, as expressed in subsequent New York decisions, 3 is to
that a bank which had given information on tax law and prepared legal documents pertaining to estates and trusts, had not violated the statute because in
performing such acts they "are acting primarily for themselves in the proper
exercise of their functions as fiduciaries . . . and are not engaged in the
practice of law." Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich.
214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955), perrmitted conveyancing as incidental to a
broker's business. See Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818
(Fla. 1954). LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d
246 (1948), construing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (1930), did not consider the gratuitous preparation of legal papers in question to be the practice
of law. Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934) held that the
drafting of legal instruments is prohibited only when not connected with
the immediate business of the person preparing them.
"2State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685
(1961), Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.014, 256.30 (1957). New Jersey State Bar
Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 32 N.J. 430, 445, 161 A.2d 257, 265
(1960), interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-78 (1953) which forbids
corporations to practice law, said that a corporation can "in pursuance of its
lawful- business activities, insure titles and cause searches and abstracts
to be made . . . ." In this case the title company as mortgagee was allowed
to draw the bond and mortgage provided no charge was made; if the fee
charged for the services is so high as to imply the inclusion of a separate
fee for the legal services it will be held to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo.
398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957), having considered CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-1-17 (1953) which is similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4 (1958), held
that a licensed real estate broker could, without separate charge, prepare
deeds and related instruments at the request of his customers in connection
with a bona fide real estate transaction. The court in this case while rejecting
the "incident-to-business" theory allowed such corporate activities because it
was the custom for brokers to render such legal services incidental to their
business and, therefore, they were acting in the public interest. Cowern v.
Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 209 N.W. 795 (1940), involved MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 481.02 (1958) prohibiting a corporation to practice law.
" People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919), where defendant
who drew legal instruments was held to have violated N.Y. PENAL LAW § 270
requiring a license to "practice as an attorney at law." People v. People's
Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1917) ; People v. Purdy,
174 App. Div. 694, 162 N.Y. Supp. 70 (1916).
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prevent corporations from performing legal services which can only
properly be done by licensed attorneys, under direct supervision of
the court, whose interest is in their clients rather than the corporation. In later cases,' 4 however, the New York courts held that the
statute did not prohibit an employee of a corporation authorized to
guarantee mortgages from filling in the blanks of a form mortgage
and charging a fee for the service. Considering the public convenience and long-standing practice involved, the court said that
such single occurrences did not constitute the practice of law or
violate the penal code since no legal advice was given, and a layman
could lawfully perform such acts. Subsequent New York decisions 5
apparently overruled these cases by holding a title insurance company which drafted mortgages to have practiced law in violation of
the penal law.
The Texas statute"8 has been strictly construed to hold that
", Wollitzer v. National Title Guar. Co., 148 Misc. 529, 266 N.Y. Supp.
184 (Sup. Ct. 1933), af'd, 241 App. Div. 757, 270 N.Y. Supp. 968 (1934);
People v. Title Guar. Co., 191 App. Div. 165, 181 N.Y. Supp. 52, a'd,230
N.Y. 578, 130 N.E. 901 (1920). The dissent in the appellate division, in
the latter case said that the corporation through its employees went beyond
191 App. Div. at 167,
its chartered powers in advising on legal matters.
181 N.Y. Supp. at 53 (1920) (dissent). In People v. Title Guar. Co., 227
N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919), the court held that although the legislature
has allowed the defendant to search and insure titles, such work being between
the corporation and its employees, the drawing of legal instruments is legal
work which though it relates to insurance of titles affects individuals in
other ways also and, therefore, such legal service should be performed by
lawyers.
" People v. Lawyer's Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 520, 27 N.E.2d 30, 33,
reversing 258 App. Div. 916, 16 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1940), held that "the defendant is not protected by the provisions of section 280, which exempt a
corporation engaged in the examination and insuring of titles to real property. That exemption has no application whatever to services which cannot
be lawfully rendered by a person not admitted to practice law in the state
of New York ....

Nor may the defendant protect itself behind the claim

that the services rendered were necessary to the examination of titles and the
issuance of its policies of insurance." See also Application of N.Y. County
Lawyers' Ass'n, 181 Misc. 632, 43 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1943), in which
a tax and management corporation which gave legal advice to and prepared
legal documents for its subscribers was -held to have engaged in the "illegal
practice of law" even though it told its clients to consult private attorneys.
"' Tax. Rav. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 3 (1959) prohibits all persons who are not members of the bar from practicing law in Texas. Tex.
Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 238, § 62, repealed by Tex. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 301,
§ 62, prevented any corporation, person, firm or association from practicinglaw. The reason given for the repeal of this statute was that it had no
practical value since the State Bar Act subsequently enacted (Tax. Rav.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1 (1959) prohibits all persons not members of
the bar from practicing law. The present statute gives power to the courts
to define "practice of law" and to protect the public from its practice by
laymen and corporations through civil proceedings.
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corporations who draft any kind of legal instrument are guilty of the
unauthorized practice of law. The Texas court1 7 has consistently
held that in performing these acts corporations were rendering legal
services to others and acting ultra vires.
In answer to the argument that the practice of law by corporations is in the interest of public policy it can be argued that a corporation cannot give legal advice without regard to its own interests.
When an employee of a corporation, whether he is a layman or an
attorney, renders legal services for his corporation and another, the
The North Carolina Supreme
non-corporate party is cheated.'
Court argues that the purpose of G.S. § 84-4, and inferentially G.S.
§ 84-5, is to protect the public rather than the legal profession; but
the question remains as to whether this is the way to protect the
public. There are persuasive opinions saying it is not,"0 for the
public is entitled to a legal representative who has a legal education
and whose first and only loyalty is to his client's interests.
Some courts feel that if a corporation is allowed to prepare legal
documents which are necessary to carry out its business objectives
there is nothing to stop a building constructor, insurance company,
or bank from claiming that because their business requires properly
drafted deeds and other instruments affecting title to property they
should be allowed to prepare them. There is danger in stretching
the "its own business" concept so far that ultimately most of the
out-of-court legal work may be performed by corporations and others
" O'Neal v. Ball, 351 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) held that an
abstract company could not draft a conveyance even through its agents. In
San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291
S.W.2d 697 (1956), an injunction was granted to prohibit a corporation
engaged in selling abstracts and title insurance from employing an attorney
to prepare legal instruments. Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm., 272
S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) held that it constituted unauthorized
practice of law for a title company through attorneys to prepare legal
instruments for other persons and corporations in transactions where it had
no interest; Grievance Comm. v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945) held that the drawing of legal instruments by a corporation although
done without compensation constituted illegal "practice of law"; Hexter
Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946

(1944).

S18 Reisler, Fundamentals of Unauthorized Practice of Law for the Law
Student, 26 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcTicE NEws 11 (1960). The non-corporate
party either receives "incompetent and unethical advice" or is "served by
lawyers who are not disinterested, whose real client is not the person advised
but the entrepreneur furnishing the services."
"9Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E.
153 (1937).
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not licensed to practice law. "The law practice would be hawked
about as a leader or premium to be given as an inducenent for busi20
ness transactions."
AccO6rding, to the Pledger case the drafting of. legal instruments
would be warranted by a corporation provided the 1egahl services so
rendered are to its custoners pitrsuanit to tiansactions in which the
corpor4ion has a primary interest.. It is arguable that this practice
is not protective of the public interest2 1 If the legal services involved
require the knowledge judgment, and advic of an attorney, and the
interests of someone other than the corporation are involved, the
corporation should not be permitted under G.S. § 84-5 to render
that service in spite of the fact that its interest may also be involved.
'If the employee 'of -the corporation renders this service he is prirarily serving the interest of the corporation and is selling the legal
service to a customer of the corporation.. It is almost impossible
for him to serve equally both customer aid corporation for he
,cannot be impartial.'
This could result in harm not only to the
legal profession and the lay practitioner" who is liable for his
mistakes, but also t6 the customer who does-not have the advantage
.of an impartial representative who can give advice as to the legal
implications of the 'document drafted.
BONNIE DOUGLASS MENAKER
20

Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 519,

179 S.W.2d 946, 953 (1944).
" In Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 817, 273 P.2d 619, 625 (Dist.
-Ct. App. 1954) the court said that "any rule which holds that a layman
'Who prepares legal papers . . . is not practicing law when such services
are incidental to another business ... completely ignores the public welfare."

See also State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961).
.

. "In addition it requires no extensive citation of authority to prove that
even so simple inact as filling in the blanks of a form deed is fraught with
pitfalls for the inexpert. The reports abound with examples of defective
deeds, sometimes fatally so, resulting from carelessness, ignorance or both.
The lay practitioner may prepare many" hundreds- of perfect instruments,
but this is small consolation to the unhappy client who, at .best, is subjected
to an expensive lawsuit to. perfect his title or, at worst, loses his land, due to
,an "honest mistake." True, the same might have happened had he had
competent legal advice, but the chances are far less.
"Pelletier, Unauthorized Practice of Law by Real Estate Brokers and
Title Insurance Coinpanies, 27 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcTicE NEWS 217 (1961).

